My comment was about the phenomena P of universe U. If something exists “apart from Nature”, where “Nature” is supposed to refer to the universe and its phenomena, then it isn’t relevant to that universe and its phenomena. If it is relevant, then it isn’t “apart from” it. To say otherwise is just to play silly word games, not to seriously try to work out what is true.

Tom Clark would agree with you. I do not

I couldn’t care less whether you disagree, only whether you can point out an error and present a counterargument. Evidently you can’t.

another way of wording my definition is to say that the supernatural is that which appears to have the ability to manipulate that which we call space/time/energy/matter but does not necessarily behave according to that which we call universal laws. Is this absurd? Sure it is, but that’s because supernaturalism is absurd.

Unless “absurd” is a synonym for “incoherent”, it’s just name calling, not a reasoned objection. (Carrier, being a reasonable person, does not consider supernaturalism to be absurd.) I explained why I think the notion of the supernatural is incoherent.

That is what it is to be supernatural—it is that which is not itself natural but which can interact with the natural. That is the best distinction I can articulate without simply defining anything that is real as natural (even if I think that is the case).

Again, this is meaningless word play — a much more sound approach is to define anything that is real as natural.

Unless that something exists apart from Nature. I think it’s obvious that I don’t believe such a thing exists, but it’s merely an *assertion* to say it is impossible.

Thus “the supernatural is unconstrained by our natural laws” is nonsense and “(i.e. those that underlie matter/energy in space/time)”, is circular — natural laws are not a priori constrained to “matter/energy”, or to “space/time”. Likewise “the supernatural has the capability to cause physical changes by manipulating natural laws or bypassing them” is nonsense — “manipulating natural laws” is a downright category error; “manipulating” an assertion as to what is universally true can only be done by making a different assertion.

I have found that any discussion of the fundamental properties of nature eventually becomes absurd. Words like “law”, “space”, or “energy” are ultimately abstractions with no possible way to provide one-to-one meaning/reality utility. Nevertheless, we can look out at the universe and come to some tentative conclusions about how it’s put together, i.e. what it’s made of and how it works. “Laws” merely describe these observations. And so, another way of wording my definition is to say that the supernatural is that which appears to have the ability to manipulate that which we call space/time/energy/matter but does not necessarily behave according to that which we call universal laws. Is this absurd? Sure it is, but that’s because supernaturalism is absurd.

“The second point describes the basic freedom the supernatural has from what makes our universe possible. Whatever the properties of the supernatural thing or occurrence, it would not be constrained by our natural laws. For example, none of the four fundamental forces of our universe (strong, weak, electromagnetic, and gravity) would play any role in the behavior of the supernatural.”

This just won’t do. If the supernatural is in the universe, then whatever makes *it* possible must be part of what makes the universe possible.

Tom Clark would agree with you. I do not, and neither does Richard Carrier. But it’s all pure speculation about something that very likely doesn’t exist anyway.

If that is not found among “the four fundamental forces of our universe” then those four forces *are not a complete description of our universe*. This division between “our” natural laws and “the properties of the supernatural” is totally ad hoc. By this formulation, the many phenomena that we know of now but had no clue about in the 1800?s would have had to be deemed “supernatural” at the time, and dark matter might turn out to fit that bill, as we currently have virtually no idea what it is and what governs it. And with string theorists talking about rolled up dimensions and colliding branes, there might be a *whole lot* more going on than what can be accounted for by these “four fundamental forces” — which might not be so fundamental after all.

I agree with everything you say here. It is entirely possible, and even probable, that we will discover new “laws” as our ability to peer into nature become more sophisticated. But that does not change my natural/supernatural distinction at all. If the supernatural exists, then it does not behave within the confines of our universe’s natural laws, whatever they turn out to be. That is what it is to be supernatural—it is that which is not itself natural but which can interact with the natural. That is the best distinction I can articulate without simply defining anything that is real as natural (even if I think that is the case).

“The second point describes the basic freedom the supernatural has from what makes our universe possible. Whatever the properties of the supernatural thing or occurrence, it would not be constrained by our natural laws. For example, none of the four fundamental forces of our universe (strong, weak, electromagnetic, and gravity) would play any role in the behavior of the supernatural.”

This just won’t do. If the supernatural is in the universe, then whatever makes *it* possible must be part of what makes the universe possible. If that is not found among “the four fundamental forces of our universe” then those four forces *are not a complete description of our universe*. This division between “our” natural laws and “the properties of the supernatural” is totally ad hoc. By this formulation, the many phenomena that we know of now but had no clue about in the 1800′s would have had to be deemed “supernatural” at the time, and dark matter might turn out to fit that bill, as we currently have virtually no idea what it is and what governs it. And with string theorists talking about rolled up dimensions and colliding branes, there might be a *whole lot* more going on than what can be accounted for by these “four fundamental forces” — which might not be so fundamental after all.

Another “possibility” is that the brain doesn’t perceive a god but the immaterial soul which is the source of true consciousness. Of course, that still doesn’t answer how information from an immaterial soul enters into the physical brain, which it must at some point. The level of ad hoc assumptions that are unexplorable adds up quick in the supernatural model.

But in the natural model, we can conclude that any perceptions of a god are entirely artifacts of the brain and we can do so based on existing knowledge. No ad hoc assumptions necessary.